What are the implications of state sovereignty for humanitarian intervention? (Part Two)

The traditional framework of peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention is only workable when warring factions show a willingness to cooperate with UN prerogatives. If aggressors are determined to prolong the violence, then there is little that the UN can do to stop them in the short run. Aggressors may also reject humanitarian intervention on the grounds that it represents a form of neocolonialism. Their justification is that UN peacekeeping is used by first world countries to impinge upon and dominate weaker ones. In such instances, the very principle of respecting state sovereignty proves to be a stumbling block for the UN.
In 1999, the citizens of East Timor decided to vote for independence after two decades of Indonesian rule. As a direct result, violent gangs backed by elements of the Indonesian military went on the rampage to reverse the vote. Over 2000 people were killed and much of the country's infrastructure was devastated. Troops led by Australia had to wait for almost a month for consent from Indonesia before any intervention could happen. It is now believed that the reason for this delay was to bring about a scorched earth policy; to give the gangs the chance to inflict as much damage as possible.
Another consideration is the rigid rules of engagement (ROE) that UN troops must abide by. These rules dictate how, when and where military force may be applied. Once UN troops are allowed into a country, they are seen as nominal guests operating within the parameters of state sovereignty. They must try to perform their duties in a neutral and non-threatening manner. Aggressive posturing is strictly forbidden, hence the requirement for peacekeepers to be lightly armed. They can only discharge their weapons in self-defense. Unfortunately, such restrictive ROE has proven to be counterproductive.

In Somalia, the UN faced problems delivering supplies to the people who needed them most. Humanitarian aid was made difficult with the presence of heavily armed roaming militia. These militants were xenophobic by nature and distrustful of the peacekeepers. As a result, a number of them were killed and maimed because they lacked the means to properly defend themselves.
In Rwanda, General Romeo Dallaire led a peacekeeping force that was grossly under-equipped and vastly outnumbered. He managed to save over 20,000 civilians only by disregarding the UN ROE.
In Bosnia, the peacekeepers at Srebrenica could do nothing to enforce the safe area and protect the victimized Bosniaks. They were simply outmatched by the hostile Serbians who were wielding superior weaponry.
In Sierra Leone, rebels of the Revolutionary United Front broke the ceasefire in 2000 and overwhelmed hundreds of peacekeepers, taking them hostage. Most embarrassingly, arms, ammunition and vehicles belonging to the peacekeepers were seized and used to further the rebel assault on the ruling government.
It can be readily observed that in many of these instances, the UN Security Council has failed to act swiftly and decisively in the face of serious upheavals and violence.
This is largely due to the fact that the UN does not have a standing army of its own. It draws its troops from its member states on a voluntary basis. A peacekeeping force is only put together in an ad-hoc style when a crisis occurs. This produces delay and inefficiency. The decisions made on a political level may not match the pressing realities on the ground. Logistics, for example, is notoriously hard to coordinate at such short notice.
This shortcoming is the direct result of the UN’s founding principle of respecting state sovereignty. It does not impose peacekeeping commitments on its members and must wait for contributions to be greenlit before it can proceed with any intervention.
To remedy this problem, a proposal has been put forward for a rapid reaction force to be organized and maintained under UN jurisdiction. Such a force will be specially trained and placed on standby, for prompt deployment in the event of emergencies. This development will free the UN from relying solely on the goodwill of its member states. More importantly, the very existence of a rapid reaction force has the potential to cut through the red tape and save many lives in the long run. Serious discussions on this will take place next month as part of the UN summit on reforms.

However, there still remains the prickly issue of political will to contend with. When a contradiction exists between the desire to pursue humanitarian intervention and the need to respect state sovereignty, the UN suffers a breakdown of collective security. This is a twilight zone where it is easier for the international community to drag its feet, rather than get involved in civil conflicts.
Statesmen such as Henry Kissinger and Robert McNamara have substantiated doubts about the traditional notion of collective security. They believe that it is far too idealistic to function effectively in today’s world.
Firstly, the resources and effort required to carry out humanitarian intervention are often very costly. Conversely, the benefits gained from such action may be very low. No one really has the desire to forcibly intervene in a civil conflict and end up making enemies.
Secondly, unless the international community is directly threatened, the members of the UN may be slow to react. A crisis erupting in a country may be perceived to be an internal matter. Intervention will not be exercised to the fullest extent out of blind respect for state sovereignty.
Thirdly, the democratic conventions of the UN may prove to be a drawback. Decisions are made because they are popular, as opposed to being moral and humane. It is quite possible for a country guilty of genocide to use such conventions to rally support against humanitarian intervention.
Fourthly, the UN runs into a brick wall when it cannot secure the participation, support and funding of the United States. Despite being the world’s leading power, American troop commitments comprise less than 2% of total UN peacekeeping forces. This is due to the fact that the United States is reluctant to hand over command and control of its troops to the UN. The United States also owes the UN over $1 billion in arrears. All too often, the UN has been used as a global platform by critics to attack American foreign policy. Because of this, the United States withholds funds in a deliberate effort to pressure the UN to tone down and comply with its wishes.
The United States is arguably the most fiercely independent sovereign state on the UN Security Council. Because of its tremendous power and influence, its stubbornness can be terribly obstructive. This handicaps the UN, which cannot pursue humanitarian intervention with absolute effectiveness.
We have explored the various ways in which state sovereignty impacts and undermines the pursuit of humanitarian intervention. But does humanitarian intervention effect state sovereignty?
As mentioned earlier, there are those who believe that humanitarian intervention only serves to usurp state sovereignty. Since the collapse of European colonialism, military/political control of the Third World has largely ceased to exist. But it is now alleged that powerful countries use alternative means to dominate and exploit underdeveloped ones. This is known as neo-colonialism.

Seen in this light, intervention by the UN is merely an extension of the old colonial philosophy known as the White Man’s Burden. Non-European cultures have historically been perceived as being backward and immature. Without outside assistance, they will continue to be mired in poverty and conflict. It is therefore the responsibility of the West to civilize them and guide their development until they can take their place in the world.
Critics of the UN believe that such an approach is racist and smacks of imperialism. Humanitarian intervention is merely an excuse to justify the thinly-veiled self-interest of the West. By making the Third World dependent on them, they hope to enjoy the benefits of cheap labor and raw materials. They may even seek to manipulate events to their advantage.
Countries like the Netherlands and Italy are major suppliers of military equipment and weapons. What is hypocritical is that they pursue peacekeeping efforts in the very countries that they sell arms to. This creates a serious conflict of interest. Any intervention by them may only be short-term and questionable, while long-term structural problems are left unresolved.
The involvement of UN peacekeepers in sexual slavery and prostitution has also recently surfaced in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The embarrassing scandal has involved the exploitation of under-aged girls. These abuses show a lack of respect for state sovereignty and introduce foreign problems into an already volatile landscape.
In coming to conclusion, the relationship between state sovereignty and humanitarian intervention is a close but tenuous one. They both influence each other to a tremendous extent. Most tellingly, if the international community is not careful, they run the risk of undermining one while championing the other. We can only hope that the upcoming UN summit will lead to solid reforms that will strike a more realistic balance between the need to respect state sovereignty and the need to pursue humanitarian intervention. The ability of the UN to save many lives in the future may very well depend on such a compromise.
Comments
Hmm, I think the article is too long with too small a font size. Not to mention the width, which makes the small font even smaller. =p
Posted by: __earth | August 30, 2005 01:51 AM